ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETYINTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF RIGHT-TO-KNOW
LEGISLATION IN RESPONSE TO REFUSAL OF UNITED
STATES MULTINATIONALS TO PUBLISH TOXIC EMISSIONS
DATA FOR THEIR UNITED KINGDOM FACILITIES

I.

FACTS

The publication of industrial toxic emissions data is essential to
ensuring that multinational corporations uphold international environmental excellence.' On July 29, 1992, however, reports by two
environmental groups concluded that many international industrial
corporations, including United States manufacturers of chemical products in the United Kingdom, appear unwilling to release such data
unless legally required to do So. 2 Twelve of the fifteen United States
based companies declining to release emissions data belong to the
Chemical Manufacturers Association and, as a consequence of their
refusal, fail to conform to the Association's required chemical management program. 3 Their unwillingness handicaps United States reg-

I Fred Millar, the Friends of the Earth environmental group and United States
toxic projects director, indicated at a July news conference that emissions data is
necessary to ensure multinationals are not dumping "obsolete, polluting equipment
in the developing world." Industry Appears Unwilling to Release Toxics Data Unless

Required, Studies Say, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) para. 12 (July 31, 1992), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAIED file [hereinafter Industry Appears Unwilling].
I Environmental groups Friends of the Earth and Public Data Project conducted
studies to determine, respectively, which United States based multinationals would
release emissions information and which facilities discharge pollutants into European
waterways exceeding levels reported in the United States. Of the forty-three companies
surveyed by Friends of the Earth, the following provided or promised to supply
data from their plants in the United Kingdom: Albright and Wilson, American
Cyanamid,. British Petroleum, Dow Chemical, FMC, Imperial Chemical Industries,
Lubrizol, Monsanto, 3M, Union Carbide, and UOP. Fifteen corporations refused
the request of Friends of the Earth, five did not respond, and six were still considering
the possibility of supplying the data. The Public Data Project study determined that
emissions into European waterways appeared to exceed those reported in the United
States, while the release of other toxic wastes were about the same. Id. paras. 1,
6, 23.
I The Chemical Manufacturers Association requires members to subscribe to its
Responsible Care Program, a collection of guides to chemical management, including
recognition and response to public concerns about chemical plant operations. See
id. para. 8.
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ulation of United States based companies operating in the United
4
Kingdom and deprives the public of notice of toxic emissions.
The refusal of United States multinational corporations to supply
emissions data is a consequence of the different public risk communication approaches utilized by the United States and the United
Kingdom. The United States follows a "right-to-know" approach
while the United Kingdom pursues a "need-to-know" approach.' Due
to the difference in emission disclosure requirements, concerns have
arisen that United States multinationals are operating facilities in the
United Kingdom in an effort to take advantage of lower regulatory
6
standards there.

In response to these concerns, Agenda 21,1 adopted at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in
Brazil in June, 1992,8 endorses right-to-know legislation. UNCED
4 Effective regulation of emissions requires toxicity data compilation for the
protection of public health, as well as the making of well informed individual decisions
regarding the effects of emissions. Specifically, the failure to compile and release
emissions data hinders the study of environmental and health effects of the release
of industrial chemicals. Because the relative invisibility of chemicals impairs adequate
screening of toxicity levels, emissions data aids the study of chemical effects. Mary
L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws To
Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH L. REV. 1795, 1796, 1808-09 (1989).
1 The United States chooses to require disclosure of full risk information regarding
emissions in accord with its strategy of encouraging individual corporate efforts to
improve safety. The United Kingdom, however, requires only selective disclosure of
information and contends that publication of emissions data is unnecessary under
its detailed regulatory strategy. Eckard Rehbinder, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 219 (1992) (reviewing Michael S. Baran and Daniel J. Partan, CorporateDisclosure
of Environmental Risks: US and European Law).
6 Multinationals may take advantage of differing governmental regulatory standards to identify dangerous or polluting activities in countries where environment,
health and safety regulations are weak. See Ann Rappaport and Margaret Flaherty,
Multinational Corporationsand the Environment: Context and Challenges, 14 Int'l
Envtl Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 261, 263 (May 8, 1991).
7 Agenda 21, a recommendation proposed at the United Nations 1992 Conference
on Environment and Development for United Nations (UNCED), suggests that
comparable inventories of toxic chemical emissions be developed among countries
and that international agencies such as the United Nations Environment Program
and the World Health Organization establish requirements for the compilation of
this data. Preparationsfor the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development on the Basis of General Assembly Resolution 44/228 and Taking Into
Account Other Relevant GeneralAssembly Resolutions: Cross-Sectoral Issues, U.N.
GAOR Prepatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100 (1992) [hereinafter U.N.C.E.D.
Conference Report]; see also Toxic Wastes: Poisoning the Planet, U.N. CHRON.,
June 1992, at 61 [hereinafter Toxic Wastes]; Industry Appears Unwilling, supra note
1, para. 15.
1 U.N.C.E.D. Conference Report, supra note 7. See generally The Earth Summit:
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proposes that multinational corporations operating in countries lacking laws that require toxic release reporting be required to produce
emissions data. 9 In addition, Agenda 21 suggests that international
agencies such as the United Nations Environment Program and the
World Health Organization accept responsibility for establishing the
appropriate guidelines for the data. 10 The adoption of Agenda 21
represents an attempt at international standardization of right-toknow reporting through increased requirements for information disclosure. Furthermore, the Agenda 21 proposal serves as a mechanism
for reducing multinational exploitation of differences in environmental
health and safety regulations." Addressing concerns similar to those
of Agenda 21, the environmental group findings presented on July
29 regarding the refusal of United States multinationals operating in
the United Kingdom to release emissions data 12 has re-opened the
issue of international standardization of right-to-know reporting.
II.

LAW

A. United States and United Kingdom: Differentiation in Risk
Communication and Right-To-Know Legislation
In the United States, the disclosure of industrial environmental
information has been an important aspect of regulation since the
enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970.13 Congress first outlined data assimilation and public information policies
in 1986 when Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) 14 as part of Title III of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 5 EPCRA

An Opportunity We Cannot Afford to Miss, U.N. CHRON., June 1992, at 40 (outlining
topics to be discussed at the conference).

9 Industry Appears Unwilling, supra note 1, para. 16.
10Id. para. 15.
See id. paras. 12-16.
12 See Industry Appears Unwilling, supra note 1.
13National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No 91-190, § 2, 83 Stat.
852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4370(a)(1970)); see also Stephen Jones and

Gabrielle Williamson, Continental Show and Tell: The Revealing New European
Enviro-Style, LEGAL Tu&Es, Dec. 16, 1991, at 46 (indicating that environmental
information regarding development projects and industrial operations has been disclosed to the public since 1970).
'4 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988)).
1SEmergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, Title III, § 300-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728-1758 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
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requires that public notice be given regarding the release of toxic
industrial emissions.' 6 Based upon the doctrines of informed consent,
consumer protection regulation, and the public's right-to-know, risk
communication legislation like EPCRA has emerged in response to
public demands for information . 7 The compilation and distribution
of emissions and health effects data under EPCRA legitimizes governmental industrial controls by identifying potentially dangerous
chemical toxicity levels.' 8 For example, Title III § 303(d) requires
corporate facilities to provide local emergency planning committees
with information to develop a local emergency response plan in the
event of a chemical accident.19
Additionally, EPCRA requires corporations to file toxic chemical
release forms annually by July 1 to detail chemical emissions of more
than 300 toxic chemicals and 20 chemical compounds. 20 This detailed
emissions information requirement under EPCRA serves a useful
11001-11051 (1988)). The Act requires businesses to submit two sets of annual reports
to designated state officials: one report is to document all chemicals in a threshhold
quantity on the facility premises and the second report is to list all releases that
occurred during the preceding twelve months, including legal emissions made pursuant
to permits issued by the Enviromental Protection Agency.
16 The basic requirement outlined in the United States Emergency Planning &
Community Right to Know Reporting Requirement states:
[t]he owner or operator of a facility subject to the requirements of this
section shall complete a toxic chemical release form as published . . . for
each toxic chemical listed . . . that was manufactured, processed, or oth-

erwise used in quantities exceeding the toxic chemical threshold quantity
established .

.

. during the preceding calendar year ....

42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (1988).
" Lyndon, supra note 4, at 1797; see also Jones and Williamson, supra note 13,
at 46 (stating that "public support and involvement is key to the implementation
and enforcement of environmental laws and that consequently the public must be
informed and knowledgeable").
1"Lyndon, supra note 4, at 1797.
'9 Title III § 303(d) broadly requires information "relevant" to the implementation
of local emergency response plans. By comparison, § 313 is more specific and
suggests the information should track chemicals as they enter, travel through, and
exit a facility. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title III, § 303(d), 100 Stat. 1731 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
11003 (1988)); Hazardous Substances: Superfund Law Requires Release of Data
Usable in Suits Against Firms, Lawyers Say, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) A-13 (May
19, 1988) [hereinafter Superfund Law Requires Release].
20 42 U.S.C. § 11023, (1988); see also Magnetic Media Toxic Release Inventory
Reporting Package Nears Completion, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) 112d14 (June
10, 1992). Currently, the Environmental Protection Agency seeks to add 68 chemicals
to the EPCRA reporting list, while Congress considers increasing reporting requirements through Right-To-Know-More legislation. Environment: Business Potential
Under EPCRA Great for Defense Attorneys, EPA Official Says, Daily Rep. for
Exec. (BNA) 181d8 (September 17, 1992).
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community purpose by educating people through right-to-know reporting. The requirement also prevents corporations from waiting for
a crisis to occur before communicating with the public about hazardous substances. 2' An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
computer database compiles the information, updates it annually and
makes it available to the public through the Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI). 22
In contrast, the European Community makes emissions data available only on a "need to know" basis. 2a The United Kingdom's Official
Secrets Act, for example, forbids disclosures of emissions information
to other countries without the consent of an authorized government
official.2 Although some European countries have made information
available to the public, most have maintained a tradition of secrecy
and non-disclosure. 2 This high level of secrecy is consistent with the
non-adversarial approach most European countries utilize in environmental regulation .26 Differences between environmental regulators
and industry are resolved through private negotiations and settlements
where the public plays no role and, thus, is considered to have no
need for such information.

27

Although risk disclosure information is limited, there is a European
corollary to EPCRA known as the Seveso Directive 2 , or the Directive
on Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, and, like
EPCRA, its theme is the duty to inform. 29 In 1982, the European

21 Superfund Law Requires Release, supra note 19, paras. 23, 27. The December
1984 release of methyl isocyanate in Bhopal, India from the Indian affiliate of the
United States based multinational Union Carbide is an example of technological risk
due to a lack of commensurate standards and corporate interaction with a host
community. Rappaport and Flaherty, supra note 6, paras. 9-10.
2 The information reports are filed primarily by manufacturers and must indicate
the level of toxic chemicals released into the environment during the previous year.
Other Countries Consider Adoption of Programs Similar to TRL Official Says, 15
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, para. 3 (July 1, 1992).
2 Rehbinder, supra note 5, at 219. The approach of the European Community
regarding the extent of risk communication is one of selective information based on
a "need to know" rationale.
24 Official Secrets Act 1989, Ch. 6, § 7 (Eng.), reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WHALIES 1346, 1354 (4th ed. 1989).
21 Unlike the majority of European countries, France and the Netherlands have
historically made information available to the public. Jones and Williamson, supra
note 13, at 46.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Council Directive 82/501, arts. 1-21, 1982 O.J. (L 230) 1.
29 Article 8 of the Seveso Directive requires that member states of the European
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Community Commission implemented the original Seveso Directive
to prevent or minimize the environmental risks of major industrial
accidents. 30 The Directive called for the passive provision of risk
information but has since been amended to provide for active distribution of information and public participation in the management
of hazardous substances."' In general, the Directive requires European
Community Member States to enact laws reducing chemical accident
risks at industrial plants.32 In 1988, added requirements instructed
Member States on publication procedures to be followed when a
chemical accident occurs. 3 Furthermore, in accord with the Seveso
Directive, the European Council adopted the Directive on the Freedom
of Access to Information on the Environment in June 1990 to provide
for access to and public distribution of environmental information
held by public authorities.

4

Community ensure that persons likely to be affected by a major accident in an
industrial activity are informed of the correct safety measures to be adopted. The
provision specifically provides:
Member States shall ensure that persons liable to be affected by a major
accident originating in a notified industrial activity within the meaning of
Article 5 are informed in an appropriate manner of the safety measures
and of the correct behaviour to adopt in the event of an accident.
Id; see also Jones and Williamson, supra note 13, para. 26.
" Amended after the 1984 disaster in Bhopal, India and again after a 1986
Switzerland warehouse fire, the Seveso Directive proposes procedures including production of a safety report and an on-site emergency plan to be followed by industrial
plants utilizing certain specified substances. ECC Drafts Significant Changes To
Directive On Industrial Accidents, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) at A-3 (July 16,
1991).
31 Panel of Risk Specialists Reviews Issues Involved In Communicating Risk
Information, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, 222 (April 13, 1988) [hereafter Panel
of Risk Specialists].
32 In addition to requiring the adoption of such risk reduction legislation, the
Seveso Directive requires the formulation of emergency response plans for the
communities where these facilities are operating. Jones and Williamson, supra note
13, at 46. Such a response plan would provide information relating to possible
major-accident situations, including a listing of safety equipment, alarm systems and
resources available to deal with those accidents. Council Directive 82/501, art. 5,
1982 O.J. (L 230) 3.
3 Directive 82/501, art. 8(1) was amended in 1988 as follows:
Member States shall ensure that information on safety measures and on
the correct behaviour to adopt in the case of an accident is supplied in an
appropriate manner, and without their having to request it, to persons
liable to be affected by a major accident originating in a notified industrial
activity within the meaning of Article 5. The information shall be repeated
and updated at appropriate intervals. It shall also be made publicly available.
Council Directive 88/610, art. 1, 1988 O.J. (L 336) 14-15.
34 Article 1 of the Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the
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European Community Member States have implemented the Seveso
Directive's mandate of corporate risk communication inconsistently."
While the Seveso Directive establishes corporate duties to disclose
safety and emergency response data to national officials,3 6 that flow
of information generally does not reach the public.3 7 As a result, in
several Western European countries, corporations provide toxic emissions data to federal governments but it is rarely made public.3" In
addition, the Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on
the Environment allows public authorities of European Community
Member States the right to refuse public access on the basis of several
broad exceptions, including governmental secrecy, trade secrecy, or
national security. 9 Thus, in the European Community, "there has
been no broad vesting of a citizen's or a worker's right-to-know." ' 4 0

Environment provides:
The object of this Directive is to ensure freedom of access to, and dissemination of, information on the environment held by public authorities and
to set out the basic terms and conditions on which such information should
be made available.
Council Directive 90/313, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56; see also Jones and Williamson,
supra note 13, at 46.
35 Most Member States have not made information publicly available, although
France and the Netherlands are included among those European countries that have
done so. Id.
36 Council Directive 82/501, art. 8, 1982 O.J. (L 230) 1.
37 Jones and Williamson, supra note 13, para. 4; see also Panel of Risk Specialists,
supra note 31, at 222 (suggesting that the Seveso Directive mandates definite requirements to provide emissions information to the federal government without
specifying a similar duty to local officials and thus the information flow becomes
"constricted" as it attempts to pass to the local level).
11Industry Appears Unwilling, supra note 1, para. 4.
39 The Council Directive on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment provides that Member States may refuse a request for environmental
information when it affects:
the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, international
relations and national defense; public security; matters which are, or have
been, sub judice, or under inquiry (including disciplinary inquiries), or
which are the subject of preliminary investigation proceedings; commercial
and industrial confidentiality, including intellectual property; the confidentiality of personal data and/or files, material supplied by a third party
without that party being under a legal obligation to do so; and material,
the disclosure of which would make it more likely that the environment to
which such material related would be damaged.
Council Directive 90/313, art. 3, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 57; see also Jones and Williamson,
supra note 13, at 46 (indicating industrial secrecy, privacy concerns or any manifestly
unreasonable request are also justifications for denial of access to information).
,0Panel of Risk Specialists, supra note 31, at 222.
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This policy of non-disclosure is followed in the United Kingdom
where the Official Secrets Act prohibits public dissemination of emissions data without the permission of the government.41 Additionally,

the Environmental Protection Act 199042 permits exemptions from
public disclosure on specified grounds. 4 3 These measures are in direct
contrast to United States right to know policy. Distinguishing between
the United States and United Kingdom policies at a news conference
on July 29, 1992, Fred Millar, Friends of the Earth-United States
toxic projects director, described the United Kingdom's Official Secrets Act as criminalizing the release of emissions data collected by
the government without official permission." Furthermore, the United
Kingdom's Environmental Protection Act requires publication of plant
operational processes but only if the Pollution Inspectorate does not

direct disclosure.45 In addition, the Environmental Protection Act
1990 allows exemptions from public disclosure of emissions on the
4
grounds of national security or commercial confidentiality. 6
In response to the exemptions and requirements of these acts, an
environmental group in the United Kingdom encourages public disclosure of emissions data. Seeking to resolve a "secrecy" dispute
involving London industries, Friends of the Earth publicly objected
" Official Secrets Act 1989, Ch. 6, § 7 (Eng.). Disclosures of official information
may only be made with the permission of the government.
42 Environmental Protection Act 1990, Ch. 43, § 13A (Eng.).
Disclosure is required for the grant of operating licenses; however, the Environmental Protection Act 1990 allows exemptions on the grounds of commercial
41

confidentiality or national security. Environmental Group Urging Minister To Maintain Emission Disclosure Requirement, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, 265 (May
6, 1992) [hereinafter Environmental Group Urging Minister].
Industry Appears Unwilling, supra note 1, para. 5.

Section 13(A)(2) of the Act provides:
Each local authority shall keep and make available to the public copies of
all documents sent to the authority under any provision of this Act unless
directed by the chief inspector or, as the case may be, the Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the chief inspector, that all or any
part of any such document is not to be available for inspection.
Environmental Protection Act 1990, Ch. 43, § 13A (Eng.).
Section 13(A)(1) of the Act states:
45

46

The chief inspector shall keep copies of . . . and he shall make copies of

those documents available to the public except to the extent that that would
involve the disclosure of information relating to any relevant process or
trade secret (within the meaning of subsection (3) of section thirteen of
this Act) or would involve the disclosure of applications or certificates as
respects which the Secretary of State has directed that knowledge should
be restricted on grounds of national security.
Id; see also Environmental Group Urging Minister, supra note 43, at 265.
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on April 27, 1992, to the appeals of two polluting power stations
for exemptions from the Environmental Protection Act disclosure
requirements.4 7 In pursuit of its full disclosure objective, Friends of
the Earth encourages multinational corporations to release information in the United Kingdom that they are legally compelled to
publish in the United States."
B. Dilemma Faced By Multinational Corporations: Tufts
University Study and the Home Versus Host Country Question
Corporate responses to global competitive pressures are changing
the way environment, health and safety issues are addressed in the
development of effective government environmental policies. Between
August and November 1990, a team at the Center for Environmental
Management at Tufts University conducted a survey of 98 multinational corporations, entitled "Multinational Corporations and the
Environment: A Survey of Global Practices." ' 49 The study examined
the implementation of environment, health and safety [EHS] policies
and the differences between United States and non-United States
operations in regard to those policies. 0
The Tufts University study found that the pattern of mergers and
acquisitions characterizing United States based multinationals contributes to variations in management approaches and environmental
outcomes. These variations in management styles raise questions regarding the effectiveness of internal corporate goals in light of the

In February, 1992, National Power and PowerGen first appealed to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution for commercial confidentiality exemptions. When
their requests were rejected, the generators filed a further appeal with the Environment
Secretary. Environmental Group Urging Minister, supra note 43, at 265. Friends of
the Earth has pursued its objective of public distribution of hazardous and toxic
chemical information since March 27, 1991, when it launched its "right-to-know"
campaign. The campaign focused upon companies operating in both the United
Kingdom and the United States and encouraged them to publish toxic emissions
data. Chemical Industry Signals Willingness To Publish Data On Emissions of Toxics,
14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, 199 (April 10, 1991).
,8The Friends of the Earth campaign requested BP, Dow, DuPont, ICI, Monsanto
and others with United Kingdom facilities producing organic chemicals, plastics and
paints, to publish information annually on inventories of toxic emissions from their
British production plants. Id.
The team examined how a group of multinationals currently address environment, health and safety issues in the hope of establishing improved corporate practices
in these areas in response to their findings. Rappaport and Flaherty, supra note 6,
at 261.
s0 Id. para. 6.
41

49
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suggested development of global standards. 5' Thus, attempting to
comply with the EHS programs and publication requirements of the
different regulatory regimes in which they operate is an important
concern for multinational companies.5 2 In addition, fear that competitors might benefit from less stringent environmental regulations
may be a compelling factor in the opening of United States based
facilities in places like the United Kingdom. 3 A primary concern,
also pointed out in the study's analysis, is that "multinationals may
take advantage of different standards between home and host government to locate dangerous or polluting activities in areas where
EHS regulations are weak."' ' Therefore, determining whose EHS
rules apply presents problems for multinationals operating in countries
with contrasting regulatory legislation and disclosure requirements."
C. Multinational Corporationsand Reporting in the Absence of
Right-To-Know Legislation: Public Data Project Survey
In June, 1992, the environmental group Public Data Project, with
assistance from Friends of the Earth, conducted a survey to determine
whether multinational corporations perceive a societal obligation to
publish toxic emissions data, even in the absence of right-to-know
legislation.5 6 The survey, modeled after the TRI, asked forty of the
leading international industrial companies to provide information on
their toxic chemical emissions. 57 Only six of those companies provided
responses to the survey questions. The others either did not respond
to the questionnaire but provided other environmental information,
did not respond at all, or indicated that data was unavailable. 9

11The size, scale, structure and operation of multinationals are complex and
varying. Multinationals often are composed of several separate companies in vastly
different businesses with substantial internal differences in management styles and
environment, health and safety problems. Id. para 17.
52 How multinationals choose to use their resources is important not only to
worldwide environment, health and safety but also to the corporations' realistic
chances for sustainable economic development and growth. Id. para. 16.
5 Id. paras. 42-43.
IId. para. 33.
Id. para. 46.
16 David Sarokin, Public Data Project Report, Toxic Releases From Multinational
Corporations: Does The Public Have A Right To Know?, Public Data Project
Report, 1 (1992) [hereinafter Toxic Releases from Multinational Corporations].
17 Id. at 3.
11BP (British Petroleum Company) PLC, Dow Chemical Co., ICI (Imperial
Chemical Industries) PLC, Monsanto Co., Union Carbide Corp., and Xerox Corp.
were the six multinationals who provided data and completed the survey. Id. at 5.
19AT&T Corp., CIBA-GEIGY Ltd., E.I. Du Pont Company, Exxon Corp., IBM
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The survey compared the emission levels of European plants with
levels of the same multinational corporations' United States plants.60
Of the six companies that produced survey data, the European facilities reported a total of 7.1 million pounds of toxic chemical waste
generation. 6' Analysis of the data indicated that the average toxic
discharges in Europe exceeded those in the United States by more
than 500%.62
EPCRA requires publication of information regarding the United
States operations of the thirty-four corporations that declined to
provide emissions data, but little is known about their operations
elsewhere. 63 Emission levels of these corporations may possibly be as
substantial as those of the multinationals who did respond to the
survey. 64 Without right-to-know legislation mandating disclosure, uncertainty exists regarding the potential severity of toxic release levels. 65
III. ANALYSIS
The Value of Compulsory Publication

A.

The lack of full disclosure right-to-know legislation in the United
Kingdom raises concerns that United States based multinationals may
take advantage of varying standards among home and host governments.66 Forty percent of corporate respondents in the Tufts University
study agreed that "one reason that U.S. corporations locate in foreign
'
countries is that EHS regulatory systems in those countries are weak. 67

Corp., Nestle S.A., Procter & Gamble Company, Rockwell International Corp.,
Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, Solvay & CIE S.A., and Toyota Motor
Corporation all acknowledged the receipt of the survey but did not complete it.
-General Electric Co. and Bayer AG did not complete the survey either but did supply
an environmental report. Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.

The 7.1 million pounds of toxic chemical waste included 5.0 million pounds
of air emissions, 1.6 million pounds of surface water discharges, 285,000 pounds
of on-site land disposal and 170,000 pounds of off-site shipments of recycled or
incinerated wastes. Id. at 7.
62 When comparing large discharges of specific chemicals produced by companies
with plants located both in the United States and Europe, 2,965 pounds of surface
water discharge was produced in the United States compared with 1.67 million
pounds of surface water discharge in England. Id. at 16.
63 Id. at 17.
61Id. at 18.
61

65

Id.

Multinationals may attempt to locate dangerous or polluting activities in areas
where EHS regulations are weak. Rappaport and Flaherty, supra note 6, at 262.
61 Thirty-five percent of the respondents disagreed and the remainder had no
opinion on the subject. Id. para. 34.
6
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Another likely reason is that problems of competitive fair play emerge
when costs of complying with EHS regulations are more stringent
on one multinational than on another.6 The lack of uniform standards
may also lead to insecurity that corporate competitors are receiving
benefits from lower emission publication requirements. 69
Requiring uniform publication of emissions data through right-toknow legislation serves four basic purposes. 70 First, emissions publication ensures that data are created and made available. Second, it
reduces chemical risks by encouraging voluntary industrial action or
governmental intervention in responding to regulatory standards. 7'
Third, publication promotes public participation in the decision making process regarding hazardous material levels in the community.
And, finally, it alters the balance of power among industry, government and citizens by increasing public awareness of environmental
issues .72
Furthermore, the United Kingdom Chemical Industries Association
acknowledged the value of publishing toxic emissions data in April
1991. The Association indicated that it welcomed the request of
Friends of the Earth to annually publish emissions data from British
production plants. 73 Subsequently, in an unprecedented move in May
1992, BP Chemicals became the first producer to publish land, air
74
and water emissions data from its ten largest plants worldwide.

Id. para. 47.
Id. para. 43.
70 These purposes are outlined by Susan Hadden in her review of risk communication and public policy. Paulette Stenzel, A Review of a Citizen's Right To Know:
69

Risk Communication and Public Policy by Susan G. Hadden, 22 ENVTL. L. 997,

1000 (1992) (book review).
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 The Chemical Industries Association said Friends of the Earth was 'knocking
on an open door' as the association had published a policy modeled on 'responsible
care' programs running in Australia, Cananda, France, the Netherlands, the United
States. The programs require member companies to gather performance data to be
published annually. Roy Granger, director of the industry association, stated the
group was "totally committed to a policy of complete openness on environmental
information." Granger further suggested that the non-disclosure problem is merely
a result of the chemical industry's reluctance to overwhelm the public with too much
or unnecessary information. Chemical Industry Signals Willingness, Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 199 (April 10, 1991).
7 BP Chemicals listed 170,000 tons of emissions to land, air and water, from
its ten largest plants worldwide, of which 117,300 tons were released from its five
British plants. BP made the information public in response to pressure from environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. The environmental
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Although, like BP, proponents of greater openness within the
Chemical Industries Association exist, they represent the minority.75
BP's move, for example, was voluntary and unilateral, while other
companies still refuse to disclose any information regarding their
emissions.7 6 Although compulsory emission publication is the goal of
environmental pressure groups in the United Kingdom,7 7 most industry

association members fear attack from the public upon disclosure of
emission level information. 78 A representative of the Chemical Industry Association acknowledged, however, that providing information to the public may appease the environmental groups exerting
pressure on chemical industries in the United Kingdom. 79 Thus, the
potential for increased public disclosure of toxic emissions data exists
in the United Kingdom.
B. International Standardization of Environmental Regulations
and Development of InternationalRight-To-Know Legislation As
Potential Solutions
In attempting to require United States based multinationals to
publish emissions data, the United States should not seek to pattern
right to know legislation in the United Kingdom after its own legislation. Instead, the United States should push for international
standardization of emission classification and labelling.80 The estab-

groups requested site-specific information, which was provided by BP Chemicals'
five main sites in Britain, at Baglan Bay, Hythe, Grangemouth, Hull and Barry.
Furthermore, BP has indicated it will continue its practice of releasing emissions
data on an annual basis in order to give the public full knowledge of whether its
targets for pollution reduction are being met. Chris Wheal, UK: BP Chemicals
Promises Less Secrecy And Cut In Air Emissions, REUTER TEXTLINE
2-4 (May 21, 1992).
7
Id. para. 7.

ENG'R,

paras.

Id. para. 5.
"The public has a right to know not just what BP's levels are but ICI's and
specifically those companies that are refusing to give out any information. . ." says
Fiona Weir, a representative of Friends of the Earth. Id.
71 Members are concerned about both forced and voluntary publication for fear
of public response to the reporting of high emission levels. Id. para. 7.
79 According to a Chemical Industry Association representative, "[wihile publishing figures and showing improvements will never be enough for the green activists,
appealing directly to the public with that information may be enough to steal the
thunder of the green lobby." Id. para. 8.
76

77

80 Agenda 21 endorses such standardization by recommending that individual
countries compile comparable inventories of toxic chemical emissions. Standardization
is expected to accelerate international assessment of chemical risks, harmonize classification and labeling, and establish risk reduction programs. Toxic Wastes, supra
note 7, at 61.
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lishment of uniform international EHS standards would be of substantial advantage to multinationals, as long as the corporations
perceive the guidelines as reasonable and there exists even enforcement
of the standards among home and host countries. 8' By "creating a
level playing field", the balanced application of uniform standards
would enable a corporation to feel secure that exploitation of differences in EHS disclosure requirements does not result in benefits
2

8
to competitors.
An additional benefit of international standardization is corporate
self-improvement of emission requirements as a means of avoiding
litigation which might arise from failure to comply.83 Corporate officials fear that mandatory disclosure laws could lead to increased
vulnerability to litigation for failure to publish emergency response
plans and toxicity release data.84 Risk communication laws possibly
encourage companies to develop voluntary measures to improve corporate safety with the goal of reducing their exposure to liability. 5
Any attempt by the United States to push the United Kingdom to
require full disclosure of industrial emissions by patterning its rightto-know legislation after that of the United States would be unreasonable.8 6 Right-to-know law should not duplicate United States legislation but instead should be developed in response to the demands
of the public residing in a particular country. 7 Citizens of other
countries may not require or want the same type of information as
that collected through the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in the United

s Currently enforcement varies among countries, even within the realm of industrialized countries. See Rappaport and Flaherty, supra note 6, at 263.
82

Id.

81Seventy-six percent of the responding countries in the Tufts University survey
agreed that international standardization of environment health and safety regulations
would lead to improved compliance and practice among corporations. Id.
84 Boston University Law Professor Michael Baram addressed this concern at a
conference in 1988 on the Responsibilities of Multinational Corporations to Disclose
and Communicate Risk Information. Panel of Risk Specialists, supra note 31, at

222.
85 Id.

para. 8.
Geographical and developmental differences among countries can have an
impact on their respective environment, health and safety priorities. Rappaport and
Flaherty, supra note 6, para. 70.
87 Jon Holtzman, a Chemical Manufacturers Association vice president, presented
this proposition to the Bureau of National Affairs. Industry Appears Unwilling,
supra note 1, at 519.
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States."' For example, differences in degree of development, geographic location, public concern, security issues and regulatory programs can influence internal decision making with respect to
environment, health and safety issues.8 9
Despite these differences, several countries, including the United
Kingdom, have noted the success of the Toxic Release Inventory in
the United States and have expressed interest in adopting similar
programs. 90 The EPA's Office of International Activities has indicated
that the adoption of international legislation with emission disclosure
requirements similar to the TRI would be beneficial to United States
multinationals who already have to comply with domestic reporting
laws. 9' Such legislation could enable those corporations to regain a
92
competitive advantage with their foreign competitors.
Directly addressing emission disclosure requirements, the United
Nations has established an international strategy for the management
of toxic chemicals with its recent adoption of Agenda 21. 91 The
strategy identifies five priority areas for such an international environmental program, including international assessment of risks, classification and labelling of chemicals, information exchange on toxic
chemicals and chemical risks, establishment of risk reduction programs, and strengthening national capabilities and capacities for chemical management. 94 At UNCED, the need for an intergovernmental
forum on chemical risk assessment and management was recognized.
Discussion focused on the forum as a means of implementing an
intergovernmental mechanism to achieve the goals of Agenda 21,
:s Id.

Rappaport and Flaherty, supra note 6, at 265.
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the European Community Commission have expressed plans to add versions of the United States Toxic Release
Inventory to be used as a new public information program or as a supplement to
an existing means of data compilation, according to Eileen Fesco of EPA's Office
of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. Other CountriesConsiderAdoption Of Programs
Similar To TRI, Official Says, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 446 (July 1,
1992).
'9

91 Id.

Id.
11Recommendations of the Meetings of Experts to Discuss Draft Proposalsfor
an Intergovernmental Mechanism for Chemical Risk Assessment and Management,
U.N. GAOR Prepatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.23/Annex I (1991),
reprinted in 1 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 581 (Nicholas Robinson
ed., 1992).
94 Agenda Item 6, id. at 583.
92
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including emission risk communication. 9 By utilizing the framework
and goals of Agenda 21, countries will create emissions inventories
that are compatible with other countries on an international level
and will adopt right-to-know reporting in principle, even in the absence of country specific disclosure requirements.9 And although
inherent financial problems and lack of resources often hinder the
participation of some developing countries in international agreements, special funding incentives have been established by Agenda
21 and industrialized countries.9
The recent refusal of United States based multinationals to release
toxic emissions data from their facilities in the United Kingdom
provides a basis for continuing Agenda 21's push for international
standardization of right-to-know reporting. Differences in disclosure
requirements existing in the United States and the United Kingdom
has arguably enabled United States multinationals to take advantage
of the United Kingdom's weaker disclosure requirements at the expense of a public who possesses a right to have access to emissions
information.9 8 The adoption of an international right-to-know program would assure United States multinationals that competitors in
the United Kingdom are not benefitting from lower environmental
standards and could alleviate potential abuse of less stringent emission
disclosure requirements.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The refusal of some United States manufacturers of chemical products to release toxic emissions data from their operations in the United
Kingdom is a direct consequence of the different public risk communication approaches followed by the two countries. Contrasted

91Agenda Items 6,9, id. at 583-84. The purpose of the forum would be to provide
policy guidance, required political and financial support, and to develop strategies
to coordinate environmental requirements. Agenda Item 9, id. at 584 (1992).
9 Sarokin, supra note 56, at 20.
91Special funds, such as the "World Heritage Fund", the "Wetland Conservation
Fund" and the "Interim Multilateral Ozone Fund", have been established in response
to the imbalances between industrialized and developing countries regarding ability
to participate in international programs. Preparatory Committee for the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Survey of Existing and
Instruments and Its Follow-Up, U.N. GAOR Prepatory Committee for the United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
PC/103 (1991), reprinted in 2 AGENDA 21 & THE UNLED PROCEEDINGs 743 (Nicholas
Robinson ed., 1992).
98 Rappaport and Flaherty, supra note 6, at 262.
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with the United States' "right-to-know" approach, legislation in the
United Kingdom forbids unauthorized disclosures without Parliamentary consent, and authorities there can refuse public access on
the basis of national security or trade secrecy. The different regulatory
requirements have raised concerns that United States multinationals
are opening facilities in the United Kingdom in an effort to take
advantage of its lower environmental standards and emission disclosure requirements.
Efforts to achieve international standardization of right-to-know
reporting and increased requirements for information disclosure,
through proposals such as the United Nations' Agenda 21, serve as
mechanisms for reducing multinational exploitation of differences in
EHS regulations. Several countries, including the United Kingdom,
have already expressed interest in adopting disclosure programs like
the United States' Toxic Release Inventory. Moreover, the adoption
of uniform international standards would be of substantial benefit,
as long as they were perceived by the multinationals as reasonable
and enforcement was uniform among home and host countries. The
public arguably possesses a right to toxic release data, and the adoption of international right-to-know reporting will at least assure United
States multinationals that competitors are not receiving an unfair
advantage due to lenient emissions publication requirements.
Melissa S. Padgett

